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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Warrior's honour was both a code of belonging and an ethic
of responsibility. Whenever the art of war was practiced,warriors
distinguishedbetween combatants and noncombatants,legitimate
and illegitimate targets, moral and immoral weaponry, civilized
and barbarous usage in the treatment of prisoners and of the
wounded ....
The struggle to make warriors obey the codes of
honour is not a futile or hopeless task. Rules honoured more in
the breach than in the observance are still worth having. There
are human and inhuman warriors,just and unjust wars, forms of
killings that are necessary andforms that dishonourus all.'
The civil war that was waged in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002 was
notable not only for the scale and brutality of atrocities committed
against civilians, but also for shattering the lives of a generation of Sierra
Leonean children. Thousands of children under the age of 18, both boys
and girls, served as child soldiers in Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict.
Thousands more, while not directly deployed in combat, were forcibly
joined to fighting forces.2 Many of the children who were abducted for
labour, including young girls who were raped and forced into sexual
slavery, eventually became fighters with the rebel forces.3 Some of these
children were as young as five years old.4 After a visit to Sierra Leone in
September 1999, the UN Special Representative reported that more than
10,000 children had served as child soldiers in the three main fighting
groups, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).'
1. Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern
Conscience. (Toronto: Viking, 1998) at 117 and 161.
2. See Unicef Canada, Child Soldiers, available at: <http://www.unicef.ca/eng/
travail/demobolish.html#autres>. See also Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: ChildhoodA Casualty of Conflict, 31 August 31 2000 (Al Index: AFR 51/069/2000) at 2, available
at: <http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsfIndex/AFR510692000ENGLISH/ $File/
AFR5106900.pdf> [hereinafter Amnesty International Report].
3. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1999: Sierra
Leone, 25 February 2000, available at: <http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/
1999 hrpreport/sierrale.html> [hereinafter U.S. State Department Report 1999].
4. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Sierra Leone, 24/02/2000, 23 rd Sess., UN Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add. 116, (2000), available at: <http://www.hri.ca/ fortherecord2000/documentation/
tbodies/crc-c-15-addI 16.htm>.
5. Protection of children affected by armed conflict: Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-Generalfor Children and Armed Conflict. UN GAOR,

Children in Sierra Leone were recruited and trained as combatants by
both the armed opposition and forces fighting in support of the
government. Most of the children who fought with rebel forces were
intentionally abducted from their homes and families by persons in
positions of command responsibility and forced into service. Hundreds
of children were forced to walk, shell-shocked, alongside strangers
whom they had just seen massacre their family members. 6 Some of the
children joined the forces out of desperation or disaffection, but remained
because of fear, intimidation and terror. Still others were barred from
returning home because they were literally tattooed with the insignia of
the fighting forces that pressed them into service. Many children tried to
escape but were rejected by their families and communities due to their
involvement with rebel forces.7 In some cases, government forces
summarily executed rebel child combatants whom they had captured;
other children suffered horrific physical abuse while in detention.
Human Rights Watch reports that some child soldiers were beaten to
death after being caught by members of local communities. 8 In an
interview with Amnesty International, "Peter", a 12-year-old former
child combatant, recounted: "When I was killing, I felt like it wasn't me
doing these things. I had to because the rebels threatened to kill me." 9
"Ibrahim", another former child combatant, told Amnesty International
that he witnessed the death of Mamadu Kamara, aged 14, who was killed
by the RUF because he refused to cut off the hand of someone from his
own village. '0

In October 2000, the UN Report of the Secretary-General on the
establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone stated that "more than
in any other conflict where children have been used as combatants, in
Sierra Leone, child combatants were initially abducted, forcibly recruited,
sexually abused, [and] reduced to slavery of all kinds."11 They were
forced, often under the influence of drugs and alcohol, to commit crimes
that included mutilation, amputation, rape, burning, and killing. The
victims often included the child soldiers' own families and communities.
54th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 112, UN Doc. A/54/430 (1999) at 22, available at:
<http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/misc/1-1 .pdf>.
6. Human Rights Watch, Getting Away With Murder, Mutilation, Rape: New
Testimony from Sierra Leone, July 1999, Vol.11 No 3(A), available at: <http://www.
hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/> [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with
Murder].
7. U.S. State Department Report 1999.
8. Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with Murder.
9. Amnesty International Report at 4.
10. Ibid
11. Report of the Secretary-Generalon the establishment of a Special Court for
SierraLeone, UN SCOR, UN Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) at 7.
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When child combatants refused to take drugs, such as marijuana,
amphetamines, and cocaine, they were beaten and, in some cases, killed.
When interviewed by Amnesty International in June 2000, 14 year-old
"Sayo" recounted: "When I go to the battle fields, I smoke enough
[cocaine]. That's why I become unafraid of everything. When you refuse
to take drugs, it's called technical sabotage and you are killed.'
Young girls who were abducted and forcibly recruited were often
forced into sexual slavery or "marriage" by military personnel. These
girls were typically forced to participate in support activities such as
cooking, looting, portering and sometimes combat. Rape of captured
young girls was routine. In 2002, Physicians for Human Rights reported
that 53 percent of displaced women and girls who had "face to face"
contact with the RUF suffered some form of sexual violence, including
gang rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage and molestation.13 Human
Rights Watch reported in January 2003 on women who were abducted
by rebel forces:
In thousands of cases, women and girls were abducted after being subjected to
sexual violence. The rebels often killed family members who tried to protect
their women and girls. Abducted women and girls described being "given" to a
combatant who then took them as their "wives".14
Women and girls were also forcibly conscripted into the rebel fighting forces.
The RUF established military training camps for women. During active
fighting, female combatants were sent into battle after the mer and the Small
Boys Units (SBUs).. .Female combatants had more power than female
civilians: combatants, including female combatants, who had received military
training, had substantial power to do whatever they wanted to civilians. Within
the rebel forces, however, women still held much lower status: female
combatants were assigned "husbands".
Forcibly conscripted female combatants were in many ways as vulnerable as
civilian abductees, and may have decided to stay with their rebel "husbands" for
the same reasons as their civilian counterparts i.e. shame,
lack of alternative
15
options, and economic dependence on their "husbands".

12. Amnesty International Report at 6.
13. The rate of abuse among other armed groups was six percent. See Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Sierra Leone: War-Related Sexual Abuse, available at:
<http://www.child-soldiers.org/cs/childsoldiers.nsf/0/2796e9ec29e5c9f280256c8dOO3c9
7b1 ?OpenDocument>.
14. Human Rights Watch, "We 7lKill You IfYou Cry": Sexual Violence inthe
Sierra Leone Conflict, Janurary 2003, Vol. 15, No. I(A) at p. 42, available at: <http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sierraleone/sierleon0 103.pdf>.
15. Ibid. at p.45.

Children were specifically recruited because rebel and government
commanders considered them to be compliant and believed them to be
aggressive fighters. In the process, the victims became victimizers.
During the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999, over 2,000
civilians were killed, attackers severed the limbs of more than 500
people, and sexual violence and rape were systematically committed
against women and girls. Amnesty International estimated that ten per
cent of rebel combatants in that incursion were children. 16 In 1999, Human
Rights Watch reported that "[c]hild combatants armed with pistols,
rifles, and machetes actively participated in killings and massacres,
severed the arms of other children, and beat and humiliated men old
enough to be their grandfathers."' 17 Likewise, in an interview with
Amnesty International on June 20, 2000, "Komba", who was 12 years
old when he was captured by the RUF in 1997, and was among the rebel
forces which attacked Freetown in January 1999, recounted:
My legs were cut with blades and cocaine was rubbed in the wounds.
Afterwards, I felt like a big
person. I saw the other people like chickens and
1
rats. I wanted to kill them.

Though feared for their ruthlessness and brutality, child soldiers were
subjected to a process of physical and psychological abuse and duress
that exacted a devastating toll on their physical and mental integrity.
Amnesty International reports that casualty rates were higher among
children due to their inexperience, fearlessness, and lack of training.
Child soldiers also suffered disproportionately from the general rigours
of military life, and were particularly vulnerable to disease and
malnutrition.' 9 Human Rights Watch reports that child soldiers, many of
whom were placed at the front line and forced to commit atrocities
against their own communities, have experienced a profound sense of
culpability as well as trauma. 2 0 Child soldiers who have been released or
escaped and who have been disarmed and demobilized are often
aggressive and violent, and exhibit various behavioural problems, such
as nightmares, alienation, outbursts of anger and an inability to interact
socially. 2 1 In a report published in January 2000, Mdecins sans Frontibres
stated that:

16. Amnesty International Report at 10.
17. Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with Murder.
18. Amnesty International Report at 7.
19. Ibid. at 3.
20. Human Rights Watch, SierraLeone: Sowing Terror,July 1998, Vol. 10, No. 3
(A), available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/sierra/Sier988.htm#TopOfPage>.
21. Amnesty International Report at 11.
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The psychological impact of actually witnessing horrific events imposes a
serious psychological stress. Deliberately or not, witnessing at least once events
such as torture, execution, (attempted) amputations, people being burnt in their
houses and public
rape often results in traumatic stress or even post-traumatic
22
stress disorder.

It is also clear that even after the cessation of hostilities the suffering
of children continued. While efforts by child protection agencies to trace
the families of former child soldiers have met with some success,
reuniting these children with their families has been extremely difficult.
In some cases, the parents of former child soldiers have been displaced
or killed. In other cases, former child soldiers do not even remember
their own names and have no recollection of their families. In 2001, the
United States State Department reported that many families and
communities of former child soldiers continued to reject the children due
to their perceived involvement in rebel atrocities. Even today, many
families did not want to assume responsibility for their children, some of
whom were psychologically and emotionally incapable of rejoining their
families. 23 In an interview with Amnesty International, a 16-year-old
former child soldier said: "I don't want to go back to my village because
I burnt all the houses there. I don't know what the people would do, but
they'd harm me. I don't think I'll ever be accepted in my village. 2 4
Former child soldiers, who continue to suffer even now that the
conflict has ended, have described how they were intimidated,
threatened, and brutally beaten; how they participated in the killing of
their friends and families; how they were involved in the killing and
mutilation of civilians; and how they risked being beaten or killed if they
refused to carry out these acts. The crimes that these children were
forced to commit, at once turned them into the perpetrators and victims
of horrific human rights abuses that the Special Court exists to address.

22.

M~decins Sans Fronti~res (Holland), Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone, 11

January 2000, in Amnesty International Report at 11.
23. See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
2001: Sierra Leone, 4 March 2002, available at: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/

2001/af/8402.htm>.
24. Amnesty International Report at 12.

ARGUMENT

Invoking the principle of nullum crimen sine lege to challenge Article
4(c) of the Court's statute assumes that there is a bright-line distinction
between war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law,
and that only the former may be prosecuted without violating the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege. This premise is false; there is a
long and distinguished jurisprudence of prosecutions for serious
violations of international humanitarian law.
This brief addresses three questions: 1) the illegality of recruiting
child soldiers into armed conflict; 2) the application of penal sanctions in
international humanitarian law; and 3) the proper application of the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege. Part I of our argument will establish
that the recruitment of children into armed conflict is and was
unquestionably a violation of international humanitarian law at the time
the alleged offences took place. Part II will explain when international
law permits prosecution of violations of international humanitarian law
irrespective of whether penal sanctions are attached. Amici conclude
that such prosecutions are permitted by law when the international
humanitarian law violations are of serious gravity, when they offend the
basic dignity of human beings, and when there is a sufficient international
consensus that perpetrators must bear individual responsibility. We
conclude that the recruitment of children into armed combat was a war
crime under customary law throughout the temporal jurisdiction of the
Court, not only because the alleged offences were egregious and shock
the conscience of all of humankind, but particularly because there is
determinative evidence that a segment of Additional Protocol H which
contains the prohibition on recruitment ("Fundamental Guarantees") had
attained the character of war crimes under customary law. Part III of this
brief demonstrates that the doctrine of nullum crimen sine lege cannot be
raised since it only prevents prosecution when an accused reasonably
believes that his conduct is lawful at the time it was committed.
I. THE RECRUITMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER 15 WAS PROHIBITED UNDER
BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. The Recruitment of Children was Prohibitedin Sierra
Leone at ConventionalInternationalLaw
The protection of civilians, especially children, in the conduct of war
and armed conflicts is the central tenant of international humanitarian
law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols
of 1977 establish minimum standards that States and armed parties must
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adhere to in internal armed conflicts. Their purpose is the protection of
civilians, and the treatment of the wounded, the sick, the shipwrecked,
prisoners of war, and others.
Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions, which Sierra Leone
succeeded to on 10 June 1965,25 applies explicitly to internal armed
conflicts. It requires that each party to a conflict ensure the safety of
persons taking no active part in hostilities, including civilians, members
of the armed forces who have laid down their arms, the wounded and the
sick. At a minimum, parties to armed conflicts are prohibited from hostage
taking, "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture" and "outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment."
Additional Protocol J1,26 to which Sierra Leone acceded on 21 October
1986,27 extended protection for civilians in the context of internal armed
conflicts and specifically defined the scope of special protection
applicable to children. Article 4 creates "Fundamental Guarantees" that
reiterate the protections in common Article 3:
1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased
to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been
restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and
convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is
prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors.
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the
following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1
are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever:
(a) Violence to the life, health and physical or mental
well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as
cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any
form of corporal punishment;

25.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), States Party to the Geneva

Conventions and their Additional Protocols, available at: <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/
siteengO.nsf/iwpList444/77EA 1BDEE2OB4CCDC 1256B6600595596#a2> [hereinafter
ICRC, States Party to the Geneva Conventions and theirAdditional Protocols].
26. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protectionof Victims of Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts (Protocol11),

8 June 1977, (entry into force 7 December 1978) [hereinafter Additional ProtocolI1].
27. ICRC, States Party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.

Collective punishments;
Taking of hostages;
Acts of terrorism;
Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution
and any form of indecent assault;
(f) Slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
(g) Pillage;
(h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
Children shall be provided with the care and aid they
require, and in particular:
(a) They shall receive an education, including religious
and moral education, in keeping with the wishes of
their parents, or in the absence of parents, of those
responsible for their care;
(b) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the
reunion of families temporarily separated;
(c) Children who have not attained the age of fifteen
years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces
or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities;
(d) The special protection provided by this Article to
children who have not attained the age of fifteen
years shall remain applicable to them if they take a
directpart in hostilities despite the provisions of subparagraph (c) and are captured;
(e) Measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever
possible with the consent of their parents or persons
who by law or custom are primarily responsible for
their care, to remove children temporarily from the
area in which hostilities are taking place to a safer
area within the country and ensure that they are
accompanied by persons responsible for their safety
and well-being. [emphasis added]
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

3.

While only states may become party to international treaties such as
the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, it is well-settled
that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-state actors,
are bound by international humanitarian law. 28 Thus, all parties to the
28. As matter of logic, the provisions of common Article 3 and Additional
ProtocolII, which both apply to all parties in non-international armed conflicts, are only
intelligible if they apply to State and non-state parties. See e.g. Kalshoven and Zegveld,
Constraintson the Waging of War: An Introduction to InternationalHumanitarianLaw
(Geneva: ICRC, 2001) at 74-75; the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary
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civil war in Sierra Leone were bound by the prohibition on the
recruitment of children into armed conflict that exists in international
humanitarian law.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child,29 which entered into force
2 September 1990, inter alia, recognizes the protection of children in
international humanitarian law and further requires States Parties to
ensure respect for those rules. Article 38 provides:
1. States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for
rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in
armed conflicts which are relevant to the child.
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that
persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not
take a direct part in hostilities.
3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who
has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed
forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained
the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of
eighteen years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority
to those who are oldest.
4. In accordance with their obligations under international
humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in armed
conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to
ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an
armed conflict.
Sierra Leone ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 18
June 1990,30 binding itself to the obligations listed above, including a
Activities In and Against Nicaragua(Nicaraguav. United States of America), Merits,
ICJ Reports, 1986, 112, at para. 219ff and 256 [hereinafter Nicaragua Case] in which the
Court considered whether the actions of the contras were consistent with international
humanitarian law, particularly common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; SC Res.
764, UN SCOR, UN Doc. S/Res/764 (1992) in which the Security Council reaffirmed
that all parties to the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia were bound to comply with
international humanitarian law; SC Res. 1261, UN SCOR UN Doc. S/Res/1261 (1999),
SC Res. 1314, UN SCOR UN Doc. S/Res/1314 (2000), and SC Res. 1460, UN SCOR
UN Doc. S/Res/1460 (2003) in which the Security Council urged "all parties" to comply
with their obligations under international humanitarian law.
29. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, U.N.T.S. Vol.
1577, p. 3, (adopted by GA Res. 44/25, UN GAOR, Annex, UN Doc. A/Res/44/25
(1989), entered into force 2 September 1990) [hereinafter CRC].
30. United Nations Treaty Collection: Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General,Convention on the Rights of the Child, available at: <http://untreaty.

commitment to take "all feasible measures" to ensure that children under
the age of fifteen are not recruited into any armed conflict and to ensure
respect for the international humanitarian law embodied in the four
Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols.
In sum, the prohibition on the recruitment of child soldiers under
fifteen was directly binding on all parties to the armed conflict in Sierra
Leone as of 30 November 1996, as Sierra Leone is a High Contracting
Party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional ProtocolH of
1977, as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
B. The Recruitment of Children Under 15 was Prohibited
at Customary InternationalLaw
The prohibition on the recruitment of children into armed conflict
was also well-established in customary international law prior to 30
November 1996. Recognition of the prohibition was both widespread
and virtually universal in international treaties, state practice, and other
international resolutions and instruments.
1. InternationalConventions as Evidence of Custom
Custom is a binding source of international law when a general
practice among states is recognized as obligatory. 3 Custom 32 does not
have to be universal or uniform, only substantially consistent and
general,33 otherwise it would be impossible to establish a custom and
any inconsistency would un-make the custom rather than violate it.
The fourth Geneva Convention,3 4 singles out children for special
protection in times of war, additional to that accorded to civilians and
non-combatants. Article 14 provides for the establishment of "safety
zones and localities ...to protect from the effects of war, wounded, sick
and aged persons, children underfifteen, expectant mothers and mothers
of children under seven." Article 17 provides for agreements for the
un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterlV/ treatyl9.asp> [hereinafter
Treaty United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of CRC].
31. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Merits, (Federal Republic of Germany/
Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) [1969] I.C.J. Reports 3
[hereinafter North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases].
32. The existence of custom is reflected in state legislation, international and
national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a
pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions
relating to legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly. I. Brownlie,
Principlesof Public InternationalLaw, 5th ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, 4-7.
33. The Steamship Lotus (Francev. Turkey), (1927), P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 1.
34. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protectionof Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Geneva, 12 August 1949 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
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removal of "wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and
maternity cases.. ." from besieged or encircled areas. Article 24 explicitly
provides that "Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary measures to
ensure that children under fifteen, who are orphaned or are separated
from their families as a result of the war. . ." are protected and provided
for, which may include evacuation to a neutral country for the duration
of the conflict. [emphasis added] The recruitment of children under
fifteen into armed conflict thus violates the special protections for
children accorded in the Geneva Conventions.
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions applies to internal armed
conflicts. Inter alia, article 3(1) requires that parties to the conflict treat
civilians "humanely". It specifically prohibits any violence to life or person,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, and outrages upon personal
dignity, including humiliating and degrading treatment. Arguably, the
conduct of many individuals who recruit child soldiers into conflict violates
these protections. Additionally, article 3(2) indicates that "[t]he Parties to
the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present
Convention." This demonstrates that parties should observe the other,
more specific protections for civilians and children in the Geneva
Conventions.
As of June 3, 2003, 191 countries had become parties to the Geneva
Conventions; 185 of those States were parties as of December 31,
1995, 35 including Sierra Leone. The Geneva Conventions are widely
recognized as customary international law.36
Article 4 of Additional Protocol H (1977) explicitly prohibits the
recruitment of children under fifteen into armed conflict. Currently, 156
States are party to Additional Protocol 11 and 133 of those States were
party prior to December 31, 1995, 37 including Sierra Leone and a cross-

35.

LCRC, States Party to the Geneva Conventions and theirAdditional Protocols.

36.

See for example the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the

Nicaragua Case at para. 215; Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph2

of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN SCOR, UN Doe. S/25704 (1993) at para.
35 declaring that "[t]he part of conventional international humanitarian law which has
beyond doubt become part of international customary law is the law applicable in armed
conflict as embodied in: the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of
War Victims ...
"
37.

ICRC States Party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.

section of states representative of different political, economic and legal
systems.38
The prohibition on the recruitment of children under 15 into armed
conflict was reiterated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC), which came into force in 1990. Article 38 of the CRC requires
that States Parties not only "refrain from recruiting any person who has
not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces," but also
"take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained
the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities."
There are 192 States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, including Sierra Leone.39 Parties to the convention are bound by
the prohibition on the recruitment of children, both because of the terms
of the treaty and because of the customary status of the norms it embodies.
It is the most widely-ratified human rights treaty. Significantly, not one of
the signatories or parties to the CRC registered a reservation regarding
the prohibition on recruitment of child soldiers. To the contrary, nine
counties explicitly deposited declarations deploring that the prohibition
was only limited to children under fifteen years; in their opinion, a
prohibition of the recruitment of children under eighteen years would
have been preferable. 40 Even the United States, one of two countries to
have signed but not ratified the Convention, has recognized the CRC as
a codification of customary international law.4'
The prohibition on the recruitment of children into armed conflict has
also been articulated in the African Charteron the Rights and Welfare of
the Child,42 adopted by the Organization of African Unity in 1990.
Article 22(1) of the Charter requires that States Parties "undertake to respect
and ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable
in armed conflicts which affect the child." Article 22(2) provides that
States Parties "shall take all necessary measures to ensure that no child
shall take direct part in hostilities and refrain in particular from

38. North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases.
39. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of CRC. Note that according to
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, U.N.T.S. vol.
1155, p. 331, (entered into force 27 January 1980), signatories to a treaty are obliged to
refrain from any act that would be contrary to the object or purpose of the treaty.
40. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of CRC. The nine states are Andorra,
Argentina, Austria, Columbia, Ecuador, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and Uruguay.
41. "Although the U.S. has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, . . . [t]he U.S. State Department considers the Convention a declaration of
customary law based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties..." in
United States v. Michael Domingues, Merits, Concurring Opinion of Commissioner
Helio Bicudo, Case 12.285, IACHR Report No. 62/02, 22 October 2002, at para. 20,
available at: <http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA. 12285a.htm>.
42. (1990) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force 29 November 1999).
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recruiting any child." The Charter defines a "child" as everyone under
the age of eighteen years.
In 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 3
recognized that "conscripting or enlisting children under the age of
fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate
actively in hostilities" is a war crime falling within the Court's
jurisdiction." The Rome Statute was adopted by 122 States and currently
there are 139 signatories and 92 parties.4 5
A prohibition on the forced or compulsory recruitment of children
under 18 is also found in the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention (No. 182), adopted in 1999.46 Article 1 of the Convention
obliges every State party to take immediate and effective measures to
prohibit and eliminate the worst forms of child labour. The Convention
defines children as persons under the age of eighteen and defines the
worst forms of child labour as, inter alia, "forced
or compulsory
' 47
recruitment for use of children in armed conflict.
Most recently, the OptionalProtocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,48 which was
unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 2000, prohibits
the recruitment of children under eighteen years, raising the minimum age
for recruitment from fifteen49 to eighteen for States Parties. The preamble
"condemn[ed] with the gravest concern the recruitment, training and use
within and across national borders of children in hostilities by armed
groups distinct from the armed forces of a State.. ." Additionally, it
"recall[ed] the obligation of each party to an armed conflict to abide by the
provisions of international humanitarian law." Currently, there
50 are 115
signatories and 64 parties to the OptionalProtocolto the CRC.
43. 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (entered into force 1 July 2002)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
44. Article 8(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute.
45. United Nations Treaty Collection: Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General, Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, <http://untreaty.
un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/treatylO.asp.>
[hereinafter
United National Treaty Collection, Status of Rome Statute].
46. Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, No. 182, 17 June 1999 (entered into
force 19 November 2000).
47. Articles 2 and 3, ibid.
48. 25 May 2000, U.N. Doc. A/54/RES/263 (entered into force 12 February 2002)
[hereinafter OptionalProtocol to the CRC].
49. Customary international law already prohibits recruitment of children under fifteen.
50. United Nations Treaty Collection: Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the

2. State Practiceas Evidence of Custom
Almost all states with military forces prohibit the recruitment of
children under fifteen years, and most states require that recruits,
whether voluntary or conscripted, be a minimum of 18 years old.
According to data from Child Soldiers Global Report, 2001 published by
the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 5t at least 108 States
expressly prohibit voluntary and/or compulsory recruitment of children
under the age of fifteen, although most require recruits to be at least 18.
Additionally, many of the states that allow recruitment of those under
eighteen prohibit their participation in a conflict until they reach the age
of eighteen.52 Overwhelmingly, even states without domestic legislation
prohibiting the recruitment of children have refrained from recruiting
children as a matter of practice.53
Secretary-General, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
englishinternetbible/partl/chapterIV/treaty21 .asp>.
51.
Available at: <http://www.child-soldiers.org/cs/childsoldiers.nsf/Report/Global%
20Report%202001/%20GLOBAL%20REPORT%20CONTENTS?OpenDocument>
[ChildSoldiers Global Report].
52.
Albania (18), Algeria (19), Angola (17), Argentina (19), Armenia (18), Austria
(voluntary recruits accepted at 17 but prohibited from direct participation until 18),
Azerbaijan (18), Bangladesh (16), Barbados (18; parental consent required if under 18),
Belarus (direct participation of under 18s prohibited by law), Belgium (16/18), Bolivia
(18), Bosnia and Herzegovina (17), Brazil (17/19), Bulgaria (18), Burkina Faso (18/20),
Burundi (18), Cameroon (18; parental consent required if younger than 21), Canada (16
but under 18s prevented from being deployed operationally), Chad (18/20), China (18),
Comoros (18), Congo (18), Cote d'Ivoire (18Y2), Croatia (16), Cuba (16), Cyprus
(17/18), Czech Republic (18), Denmark (18), Dominican Republic (18), Ecuador (18),
Egypt (18), El Salvador (16/18), Estonia (17/18), Ethiopia (18), Fiji (18), Finland (18),
France (16/18), Gabon (18), Georgia (18), Germany (17 but cannot participate in
hostilities until 18), Ghana (18), Greece (16), Guatamala (18), Guinea-Bissau (18),
Honduras (18), Hungary (18), Iran (16), Iraq (15/19), Ireland (17), Israel (17/18), Japan
(youth cadets allowed from 15/16 but under 18s cannot be deployed), Jordan (17/18),
Republic of Korea (17), Kuwait (18), Laos (15), Latvia (18/19), Libya (18; can volunteer
from 14 but not deployed), Lithuania (18), Luxembourg (17), Malawi (18), Mali (18),
Mauritania (16), Mexico (16/17), Mongolia (18), Morocco (18), Mozambique (18),
Namibia (18), Nepal (18), Netherlands (16 but cannot be deployed before reach age 18),
New Zealand (16/2), Nicaragua (17), Nigeria (18), Norway (17 but prohibited from
combatant status until 18), Pakistan (16 but prevented from involvement in combat until
18), Paraguay (18), Peru (18), Philippines (18), Poland (17/18), Portugal (18/21), Qatar
(18), Romania (20), Russian Federation (18), Rwanda (16), Senegal (18), Singapore
(16 /18), Slovakia (16/18), Slovenia (17/19), South Africa (17 but not deployed before
reach 18), Spain (16/20), Sri Lanka (18), Swaziland (18), Sweden (18/19), Switzerland
(17/20), Syria (conscription at 19 but no information on minimum age for voluntary
recruitment), Tanzania (15), TFYR Macedonia (17), Thailand (18), Tunisia (18/20),
Turkey (19), Turkmenistan (18), Ukraine (18), United Kingdom (16), United States of
America (17/18), Uruguay (18), Venezuela (18), Vietnam (18), and Zimbabwe (18).
53.
There are no indications of children under the age of eighteen in the
government armed forces in Bahrain, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Chad, Equatorial Guinea,
Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, Moldova, Oman, Panama, Zambia.
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Even in those rare cases where children under fifteen have been
recruited into participating in armed conflict, it is in violation of clear
domestic laws or regulations prohibiting such recruitment.5 4 Incidents of
child recruitment are almost exclusively the work of rebel forces and are
generally perpetrated by groups who also55 commit other widespread and
egregious violations of international law.
Although the domestic legislation and regulations among States restricts
or prohibits voluntary and/or compulsory recruitment of children into
government armed forces rather than expressly criminalizing it, it would
be mere sophistry to suggest that this state practice cannot support a
customary prohibition on the recruitment of children. The reality is that
in the vast majority of states, the government is the only party that can
lawfully operate armed forces and recruit individuals into such forces.
Non-government parties that recruit children for use in armed conflict do
so in contravention of the state's authority and their activities are
deemed illegal. Perhaps more importantly, where groups forcibly recruit
children, the conduct can attract criminal prosecution through penal laws
against abduction, kidnapping, and similar offences. It would be overly
formalistic, as well as inconsistent with international humanitarian
obligations, to characterize domestic regulation of military recruitment
as merely restricting recruitment rather than prohibiting or criminalizing
recruitment of children under fifteen.
Additionally, in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua,56 the International Court of Justice
essentially declared that the Geneva Conventions were customary
without an examination of the opinio juris and State practice relating to
the Geneva Conventions. As Vincent Chetail has described the judgment:

54.

E.g. Angola, Bolivia, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia & Eritrea, Iraq, Paraguay,

Peru, Rwanda, and the Former Yugoslavia.
55. Prominent examples include rebel groups in Liberia in the 1990s and the
Lord's Resistance Army. These rebel groups are also infamous for other shocking and
widespread atrocities committed against civilians.
56. Nicaragua Case. In the judgment, rather than considering the effect of the
United States' reservation to the four Geneva Conventions, the Court found that "the
conduct of the United States may be judged according to the fundamental general
principles of humanitarian law" and "in its view, the Geneva Conventions are in some
respects a development, and in other respects no more than the expression of such
principles", at para. 218.

The court seemed to consider that the intrinsically humanitarian character of the
the process by
Geneva Conventions dispensed it from any explicit discussion of 57
which treaty obligations reflect or become customary obligations.

Insofar as the prohibition on the recruitment of child soldiers found in
AdditionalProtocol II and the Convention on the Rights of the Child is
of an intrinsically humanitarian character akin to that of the Geneva
Conventions, it is arguable that evidence of domestic state practice is not
necessary to show the existence of a binding norm in customary law.
3. InternationalResolutions and Instruments Evidencing
Sufficient Opinio Juris
In addition to treaty obligations and the entrenched custom, the
language used in the international community to express outrage and
condemnation against the practice of recruiting child soldiers is
unequivocal and demonstrates acceptance among states of the binding
nature of the prohibition.
Among the plethora of pronouncements by the international community,
the Security Council as early as 1996 condemned "in the strongest
possible terms" the recruitment of children into armed combat and
"demand[ed] that the warring parties immediately cease this inhumane
and abhorrent activity." 58 In early 1998, the Council included the recruitment
of children in Resolution 1231, which condemned "atrocities" committed
in Sierra Leone, and held that perpetrators of such violations should be
brought to justice.59
In Resolution 1261 (1999), the Security Council strongly "condemned"
the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict, including the
recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and recognized that
such recruitment was in violation of international law. 60 It expressed
"grave concern at the harmful and widespread impact of armed conflict
57. Vincent Chetail, "The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to
International Humanitarian Law," IRRC (June 2003) Vol. 85, No. 850, 235, at 245
[hereinafter Chetail].
58. UN SC Res. 1071, UN SCOR, UN Doc. S/RES/1071 (1996) "Condemns the
practice of some factions of recruiting, training, and deploying children for combat" and
Security Council Resolution.
59. UN SC Res. 1231 of 11 March 1998, UN SCOR, UN Doc. S/RES/1231
(1999), Operative Paragraph 3: "Condemns the atrocities perpetrated by the rebels on the
civilian population of Sierra Leone, including in particular those committed against
women and children, deplores all violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law which have occurred in Sierra Leone... including the recruitment of
children as soldiers, and urges the appropriate authorities to investigate all allegations of
such violations with a view to bringing the perpetrators to justice."
60. UN SC Res. 1261, UN SCOR, UN Doc. S/RES/1261 (1999) at paras. 2 and
13.
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on children and the long-term consequences this has for durable peace,
security and development" and called upon all parties to comply strictly
with their obligations under international law. 6 '

Security Council

Resolution 1314 (2000) "reaffirm[ed] its strong condemnation of the
deliberate targeting of children in situations of armed conflict. . ." and
again "urg[ed] all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international
law applicable to the rights and protection of children in armed
conflict.. .,,62 The Security Council explicitly invoked the international
humanitarian protection of children in the Geneva Conventions, the
Additional Protocols, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child and the Optional Protocol thereto.63 Resolution 1379 (2001)
of the Security Council similarly urged compliance with international
law applicable to children in armed conflict, particularly the Geneva
Conventions, Additional Protocols, Convention on the Rights of the
Child and Optional Protocol.64 Security Council Resolution 1460 (2003)
noted that the recruitment of children under fifteen had been classified as
a war crime and again urged parties to comply with international law
regarding children in armed conflict and called upon those parties who
are recruiting or using children in violation of international law to
immediately halt such activities.65 Indeed, the Security Council's call to
bring the perpetrators to justice reflects the criminal nature of the acts
and the international community's resolve to prosecute the worst
offenders as gross human rights abusers operating outside the bounds of
law.
At a minimum, the constant condemnation of the recruitment and use
of children under fifteen in armed conflict by the Security Council and
its repeated denunciation of such conduct as violating international law
effectively demonstrates the general acceptance by UN Member States
of the existence of a norm binding on all States and non-States Parties
prohibiting the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict.
This view is echoed in the many declarations by regional organizations
condemning the recruitment and use of child soldiers, including the
declaration adopted at the Latin American and Caribbean Conference on
the Use of Children as Soldiers in Montevideo, July 1999; Organization

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Ibid., paras. 1 and 3.
UN SC Res. 1314, UN SCOR, UN Doc. S/RES/1314 (2000), paras. 1 and 3.
Ibid., para. 3.
SC Res 1379, UN SCOR, UN Doc. S/RES/1379 (2001).
SC Res 1460, UN SCOR, UN Doc S/RES/1460 (2003).

of African Unity Resolution 1659 on the plight of African children in
situations of armed conflicts, July 1996; the Decision on the African
Conference on the Use of Children as Soldiers, endorsed by the
Organization of African Unity Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, July 1999; the Declarationby the Nordic Foreign Ministers
Against the Use of Child Soldiers, 29 August 1999; the European
ParliamentResolution on the 1 0 th Anniversary of the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1999; the Organization of
American States Resolution 1667, 7 June 1999; the Organization of
American States Summit Declaration on Children and Armed Conflict,
Resolution 1709, 5 June 2000; and the Inter-American Commission
Recommendationfor Eradicatingthe Recruitment of Children and their
Participationin Armed Conflicts, 13 April 2000.66
4. The Customary Prohibitionon Recruitment of Children Under
15 was EstablishedPriorto 30 November 1996
On the basis of the widespread, unequivocal acceptance of the norm in
Additional ProtocolII and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in
the international community, as well as the extensive supporting state
practice, amici submit that the prohibition on the recruitment of children
under fifteen most certainly entered customary international law prior to
30 November 1996.
Subsequent events only reinforce the codification of the customary
prohibition on child recruitment. These further demonstrations include
additional international conventions prohibiting recruitment of children,
such as the Rome Statute and the Optional Protocol to the CRC 67 and
the numerous international declarations strong [sic] condemning the
practice. 68
II.

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

The recruitment of children under fifteen is a norm of a criminal
nature, entailing individual criminal responsibility. International
humanitarian obligations, such as those in the Geneva Conventions and
Additional ProtocolH are of a different nature than international human

66. All declarations available at: < http://www.child-soldiers.org/cs/childsoldiers.nsf7
DocumentTheme?OpenView&Start= 1&Count=30&Expand=8#8>.
67. See also e.g. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and ILO
Worst Forms of ChildLabour Convention (No. 182).
68. See text accompanying note 41.
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rights obligations, 69 and may attract individual criminal responsibility
even where penal consequences are not expressly provided for in the
relevant conventions.
A. InternationalHumanitarianLaw Clearly Permits the Prosecution
of Individualsfor the Commission of Serious Violations of the
Laws of War, Irrespective of Whether They are
Expressly Criminalized
This has been confirmed by national and international courts, state
practice, legal scholars and United Nations organs.
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 on the laws and customs of
war did not make any provision for the prosecution of individuals who
breached the Conventions.70 Nonetheless, prior to the Nuremberg Tribunal,
trials of such persons were routinely conducted by national tribunals
applying customary international law, the Conventions or in the case of
their own personnel, the national military or criminal code.7'
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg prosecuted violations
of the Hague and Geneva Conventions7 2 of 1907 and 1929, respectively,
despite the absence of express criminal sanction. Article 6(b) of the
Nuremberg Charter provided the Tribunal with the jurisdiction to
prosecute
WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such

violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns 7or
villages, or devastation not justified by military
3
necessity. [emphasis added]

69. See discussion in Chetail at 238-41.
70. See particularly Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.
The Hague, 29 July 1899 and Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.
The Hague, 18 October 1907 [hereinafter "Hague Conventions"].
Available at
http://www.icrc.org/.
71.

L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 2 nd ed., (Manchester:

Juris Publishing, 2000) [hereinafter "Green"] at 35.
72.

Conventionfor the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in

Armies in the Field, Geneva, 27 July 1929 and Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisonersof War, Geneva, 27 July 1929. Available at http://www.icrc.org/.
73. Charterof the InternationalMilitary Tribunal at Nuremberg, August 8, 1945.

Professor Ratner and Abrams make the following observation about
Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter:
Although the Charter relied upon existing law under the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, it served the important purpose of affirming individual culpability
for violations of the laws or customs of war.. other post-war trials built upon
the trial of the major criminals. These included the trials under Control Council
Law No. 10 as well as those in individual European states. Judges routinely
74
cited Hague and Geneva law to support their views regarding illegal conduct.

Violations of treaties and customs of war give rise to individual
criminal responsibility from the requirement of States Parties to enforce
treaties and punish those who commit listed offences.75 As is frequently
quoted from a Nuremberg Judgment, "That international law imposes
duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long
been recognized.... Crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be
76
enforced.,

The 1949 Geneva Conventions introduced the concept of "grave
breaches," however, they do not preclude the prosecution of non-grave
breaches of the Conventions or the Additional Protocols as war crimes.
Like the Hague Conventions, many of their provisions are prosecutable
according to the practice of states, national and international courts and
opiniojuris.

Professor Leslie Green observes that whether or not an offence is
classified as a "grave breach," certain violations of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 qualify as prosecutable war crimes.7 7

Professor Meron also confirms that "the introduction of the system of
grave breaches cannot alter the possibility that the other breaches
may be
78
considered war crimes under the customary law of war."

74. Steven J. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights
Atrocities in InternationalLaw; Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 2fd ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001) [hereinafter "Ratner and Abrams"] at 81-82. Allied Control
Council Law No. 10 authorized courts to prosecute, inter alia, "(b) War Crimes. Atrocities or
offences against persons or property constituting violations of the laws or customs of
war, including, but not limited to, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labour or
any other purpose, of civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill treatment
of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity" [emphasis added].
75. Theodor Meron, "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities" (1995)
89 Am. J. Int'l Law 554 [hereinafter "Meron"] at 562.
76. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the InternationalMilitary Tribunal,
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, 1 Official Documents 223 (1947).
77. Green at 45-46.
78. Meron at 564.
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Many countries have domestic statutes which permit the prosecution
of war crimes even if the relevant treaty being implemented does not
require penalization of such acts. For example, Belgian, Spanish, Swedish
and US war crimes statutes cover acts
79 beyond grave breaches, including
violations of Additional Protocol II.
Military manuals also support this view. For example, the U.S.
Department of Army Field Manual 27-10 (1956) notes that "The term
'war crime' is the technical expression for a violation of the law of war
by any person or persons, military or civilian. Every violation of the law
of war is a war crime." 80
B. Where CertainRequirements are Met, InternationalHumanitarian
Law ProhibitionsAttract Individual CriminalResponsibility
Professor Meron notes, "Whether international law creates individual
criminal responsibility [for prohibited conduct] depends on such
considerations as whether the prohibitory norm in question, which may
be conventional or customary, is directed to individuals, states, groups or
other authorities, and/or to all of these. The extent to which the prohibition
is addressed to individuals, whether the prohibition is unequivocal in
character, the gravity of the act, and the interests of the international
community are all relevant factors in determining the criminality of the
various acts." 8 '
Ratner and Abrams describe the elevation of offences in recent years
from prohibitions to crimes under customary international law and
conclude: "the most basic offences against human dignity do incur
individual responsibility."8'2
Professor Bassiouni claims that international crimes will either have a
"transnational" element or one of two "international" elements: 1) "a
threat to the peace and security of mankind" or "a significant international

79.

Law of 16 June 1993, 2 Codes Belges (Bruylant), at 240/5 (62d Supp. 1996);

Codigo Penal (1995), arts 607-14 (Spain), Swedish Penal Code 1986, ch. 22 § 11
(National Council for Crimes Prevention Sweden trans., 1986). The U.S. statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2441 (1998 Supp. IV), will cover violations of Protocol 11 when the U.S.
becomes a party to it. Qtd in Ratner & Abrams at 179.
80.

Qtd. in Jordan J. Paust et al., International Criminal Law; Cases and

Materials,2 nd ed. (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2000) [hereinafter
"Paust"]at 32.
81. Meronat 562.
82. Ratner and Abrams at 94.

interest", or 2) "shocking" or "egregious"
83 conduct tested by "commonly
shared values of the world community."
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic held that an
offence is subject to prosecution where the following conditions are met:
(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international
humanitarian law; (ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to
treaty law, the required conditions must be met; (iii) the violation must be
"serious", that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule protecting
important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the
victim. Thus, for instance, the fact of a combatant simply appropriating a loaf of
bread in an occupied village would not amount to a "serious violation of
international humanitarian law" although it may be regarded as falling foul of
the basic principle laid down in Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Hague
Regulations (and the corresponding rule of customary international law)
whereby "private property must be respected" by any army occupying an enemy
territory; and (iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or
conventional
law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching
84
the rule.

The Appeals Chamber relied primarily on Security Council resolutions
and debates as well as field manuals to demonstrate opinio juris that
Additional ProtocolII and common Article 3 were prosecutable violations.
It also stressed that actual state practice in the field of war was
important, but that "official pronouncements of states, military manuals
and judicial decisions" are of particular importance in determining state
practice and opiniojuris.85
C. The ICTY and ICTR have Jurisdictionto Prosecute Violations of
"FundamentalGuarantees" Contained in Additional Protocol II
1. The ICTY has Jurisdiction Over and Prosecuted Violations of
Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") was created by the Security Council and given jurisdiction to
prosecute offenders for violations of international humanitarian law that
were not expressly criminalized in their treaty form. 86 The Statute of the
ICTY provides that "[tihe International Tribunal shall have the power to
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law. . ." Article 3 provides that the ICTY "shall have the
power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war" and
83. Paust at 19.
84. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction), ICTY Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995 [hereinafter Tadic]at para. 94.
85. Tadic at para 99.
86. S.C. Resolution 827, UN SCOR, UN Doc S/Res/827 (1993).
87. Article 1 of the Statute of the ICTY, annexed to S.C. Res. 827, ibid.
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includes a non-exhaustive list of crimes taken from the early Hague and
Geneva law.
The legality of prosecuting the laws and customs of war, as well as
violations of and common Article 3, was upheld by the Appeals Chamber.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber found in Prosecutorv. Tadic that Article 3
of the ICTY Statute must be interpreted to encompass ALL violations of
international humanitarian law not explicitly included under other
articles. The Chamber concluded that the laws and customs of war include
88
violations of common Article 3 and the two Additional Protocols.
The
Appeals Chamber also held that violations of humanitarian law in an
internal conflict could be prosecuted under Article 3 of the Statute
because the Security Council had intended to criminalize such offences,
and because customary law recognized individual criminal responsibility
for violations of some of the rules applicable to internal conflicts.89
Certain learned scholars also support individual criminal responsibility
for violations for Additional ProtocolII. For example, Professor Meron
wrote in 1995 prior to the release of Tadic:
... common Article 3 and Protocol II impose important prohibitions on the
behaviour of participants in nonintemational armed conflicts, be they
government, other authorities and groups, or individuals. The fact that these
proscribed acts are considered nongrave rather than grave breaches concerns
questions of discretionary versus obligatory prosecution or extradition, and for
some commentators, universal jurisdiction, but not criminality. [emphasis
added]90

Subsequent to Tadic, the ICTY convicted many defendants for crimes
contained in the "Fundamental Guarantees" of Protocol II, including
rape, torture, cruel treatment and outrages on personal dignity. 9' It is
worth noting here that the prohibition on recruiting children in
Additional ProtocolH is found in "Article 4: Fundamental Guarantees",
the very same article as the crimes which were prosecuted at the ICTY,
providing strong evidence of its criminality in customary law as of 1995.

88.
89.
90.

Tadic at paras 86-93.
Tadic at paras 94-136.
Meron at 566.

91. Prosecutor v. Furundzija (Judgement, Trial Chamber II, December 10, 1998)
(rape and torture), Prosecutor v. Kupreskic (Judgment, Trial Chamber II, January 14,

2000) (murder and cruel treatment), Prosecutorv. Aleksovski (Judgment, Trial Chamber
I, June 25, 1999) (outrages on personal dignity) [hereinafter Aleksovski], Prosecutorv.

Tadic (Judgment, Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997) (cruel treatment).

The ICTR has jurisdiction to prosecute violations of international
humanitarian law, including "Fundamental Guarantees" of Additional
Protocol II.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") was
created by the Security Council to prosecute "[p]ersons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law... .,92 Article 4 of the Statute of the ICTR expressly provides that
the Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute violations of Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol I.
Article 4 also includes a list of offences taken from these two
instruments but provides that "[t]hese violations shall include, but not be
limited to" the enumerated list.
The fact that the Security Council included violations of common
Article 3 and Additional Protocol H in the ICTR Statute suggests that
states on the Security Council which voted in favour of the statute
believe that individual criminal responsibility attaches to
93 a significant
number of prohibitions in international humanitarian law.
The legality of these provisions as criminal offences has been upheld
repeatedly by the Tribunal. The judgments of the ICTR, in Prosecutorv.
Akayesu, 94 Prosecutorv. Musema95 and Prosecutorv. Rutaganda96 affirmed
that the "Fundamental Guarantees" of Additional Protocol 11 were
beyond a doubt pre-existing crimes under customary law. As the Court
held in Akayesu:
It should be noted, moreover, that Article 4 of the ICTR Statute states
that, "The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to
prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed serious
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II
thereto of 8 June 1977". The Chamber understands the phrase "serious
violation" to mean "a breach of a rule protecting important values
[which] must involve grave consequences for the victim", in line with
the above-mentioned Appeals Chamber Decision in Tadic, paragraph 94.
The list of serious violations which is provided in Article 4 of the Statute
is taken from Common Article 3-which contains fundamental prohibitions
as a humanitarian minimum of protection for war victims-and Article 4
92. Preamble of the Statute of the ICTR, annex of S.C. Resolution 955. U.N. Doc
S/Res/955 (1994).
93. See Ratner and Abrams at 90-9 1.
94. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, (Judgment), 2 September 1998, ICTR-96-4-T
[hereinafter Akayesu].
95.

Prosecutor v. Musema (Judgement and Sentence) 27 September 2000, ICTR-

96-13-A.
96. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda,(Judgement and Sentence) 6 December 1999, ICTR96-3), para 90.
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of Additional Protocol II, which equally outlines "Fundamental
Guarantees". The list in Article 4 of the Statute thus comprises serious
violations of the fundamental humanitarianguarantees which, as has
been stated above, are recognized as part of international customary
law. In the opinion of the Chamber, it is clear that the authors of such
egregious violations must incur individual criminal responsibility for
their deeds [emphasis added].97
Professor Meron supports this understanding of Additional Protocol
II. Prior to the issuance of Akayesu, he wrote that "[r]espect for the
fundamental guarantees of Protocol II does involve individual conduct
and, obviously, is a matter of 'fundamental concern.' An international
criminal tribunal could thus apply the provisions of Protocol II as
criminal law. 98
Amici note that the prohibition on recruitment of children is contained
in the "Fundamental Guarantees" of Additional ProtocolII. The ICTY
and ICTR judgments, as well as scholarly opinion, provide compelling
evidence that the violation was a pre-existing crime under customary
international law.
D. Recruitment of Children Under 15 is a Crime Under
InternationalLaw
Conventional law, state practice, opinio juris, declarations by the
international community and judgments by the ICTY and ICTR
demonstrate that the recruitment of children under 15 is a
sufficiently serious violation of international humanitarian law that
it incurs individual criminal responsibility. Amici urge the Court to
find that the recruitment and enlistment of children into armed
combat was a crime at all times under the temporal jurisdiction of
the Special Court.

97.
98.

Akayesu at para 616.
Meron at 560.

III. THE PRINCIPLE OF NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE IS IN
APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE

A. The PrincipleofNullum Crimen Sine Lege
1. The PurposeofNullum Crimen Sine Lege is to ProtectCitizens From
the Arbitraryand Excessive Use of State Power 99
Nullum crimen sine lege means "no crime without law." Nullum crimen
is a fundamental principle of international criminal law and most domestic
criminal systems. It is codified in international law in Art. 15 of the
InternationalCovenant of Civil and PoliticalRights ("ICCPR"), Art. 7
of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") and Art. 11 (2)
of the UniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights ("UDHR"). Sierra Leone
acceded to the ICCPR on 23 November 1996.100
Art. 15 of the ICCPR,1 ' which is virtually identical to Art. 7 of the
ECHR,10 2 states:
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the
criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the
offence, provision is made by law for imposition of a lighter penalty, the
offender shall benefit thereby.
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person
for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was
criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the
community of nations.

99. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 14 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003) [hereinafter "Cassese"].
100. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of
Ratifications of the PrincipalInternationalHuman Rights Treaties, 10 October 2003,
available at: < http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf>.
101. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 19 December 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 15 (entry into force 23 March 1976).
102. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [ECHR].
Article 7 of the ECHR states:
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the
criminal offence was committed.
2. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal
according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.
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The underlying rationale of nullum crimen is to protect citizens
10 3
against arbitrary prosecution, conviction, and punishment by the state.
Amici submit that nullum crimen sine lege is meant to protect the
innocent who in good faith believed that their acts were lawful at the
time of their commission, not to shield those accused of serious
violations of international humanitarian law.
2. When an Accused CouldNot Have Reasonably Believed That
His Acts Were Lawful at the Time They Were Committed,
the Accused Cannot Rely on Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
in His Defence
Amici submit that when an accused could not have reasonably
believed that his acts were lawful or could reasonably foresee
prosecution for his acts at the time they were committed, the accused
cannot rely on nullum crimen sine lege in his defence.
In Prosecutorv. Delalic, the ICTY interpreted s. 15 of the ICCPR as
follows:
The purpose of this principle is to prevent the prosecution and punishment of an
individual for acts which he reasonably believed to be lawful at the time of their
commission. It strains credibility to contend that the accused would not
recognise the criminal nature of the acts alleged in the Indictment. The fact that
they could not foresee the creation of an InternationalTribunal which would be
theforum for prosecutionis of no consequence.104 [emphasis added]

Professor Meron supports this view that "the principle nullum crimen
is designed to protect a person only from being punished for an act that
he or she reasonably believed to be lawful when committed." He also
stresses that a defendant cannot invoke nullum crimen sine lege when
an
10 5
offence is already prohibited under international and national law.
This is consistent with Professor Greenwood's view that nullum
crimen sine lege does not apply when conduct is universally regarded
as
06
wrongful and there is doubt only as to whether it constitutes a crime.1

103. S. W. v. The United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, judgment of
22 November 1995 (application number 20166/92) [hereinafter S. W.] at 34, 44.
104. Prosecutorv. Delalic et al. (Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber II, November 16,
1998), IT-96-21-T at 313.

105. Meron at 566.
106. Christopher Greenwood, "International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic
Case" (1996) 7 E.J.I.L. 265 at 287.

3. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege Cannot be Invoked When
Prosecutionwas Reasonably Foreseeable
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted
nullum crimen sine lege, as permitting criminal prosecution when an
accused can reasonably foresee the development of criminal liability.
Nullum crimen sine lege requires accessibility and foreseeability. 7 In
S. W v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights stated
that nullum crimen sine lege "implies qualitative requirements, notably
those of accessibility and foreseeability."' '
The Court continued by
stating that:
There will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and adaptation to
changing circumstances. Art. 7. . cannot be read as outlawing the gradual
clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation from
case to case, provided that the resultant development1 09
is consistent with the
essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.

In S. W., the Court ruled that recognition that husbands are not immune
to prosecution for rape of their wives "had become a reasonably
foreseeable development of the law." 110 The abandonment of marital
immunity was also "in conformity.. .with the fundamental objectives of
the Convention, the very essence of which is respect for human dignity
and freedom."' 11
These principles were restated in Cantoni v. France." 2 The European
Court of Human Rights again used accessibility and foreseeability 11
to3
determine whether a violation of nullum crimen sine lege occurred.
Again, the Court reaffirmed that:
This penumbra of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not in itself make a
provision incompatible with Article 7, provided that it proves to be sufficiently
clear in the large majority of cases. The role of adjudication vested in the courts

is precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking into
account the changes in everyday practice. 114

In Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany and K.-H. W. v. Germany
the European Court reaffirmed this interpretation of nullum crimen sine
107. G. v. France, European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 27 September
1995 (application number 15312/89) at 23, 25
108. S. W. at 35.
109. S. W. at 36.
110. S.W.at 43.
111. S.W at 44.
112. Cantoni v. France, European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 15
November 1996 (application number 17862/91) [hereinafter Cantoni].
113. Cantoni at 26.
114. Cantoni at 32.
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lege. The Court concluded that its task was to determine "whether [the
accused's] act, at the time when it was committed, constituted an offence
defined with sufficient accessibility
or foreseeability by the law of the
15
GDR or international law." 1
In Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated that
nullum crimen sine lege "does not prevent a court, either at the national
or international level, from determining an issue through a process of
interpretation and clarification as to the elements of a particular crime;
nor does it prevent a court from relying on previous decisions which
reflect an interpretation' as to the meaning to be ascribed to particular
ingredients of a crime." 16
In Professor Cassese's view, the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights shows not only that the interpretation and clarification
of existing international law is allowed, but that adaptation is also
allowed "to cover conduct previously not clearly considered as criminal"
under certain circumstances. 117
B. The Defence Cannot Rely on Nullum Crimen Sine Lege to Challenge
the Court'sJurisdictionto Prosecute Under Art. 4(c) of the Statute
Amici submit that the defence cannot rely on nullum crimen sine lege
because we have clearly established, in Part I of this submission, that
the recruitment of children was a crime at all times under the Court's
temporal jurisdiction.
Amici submit that even if the recruitment of child soldiers is not
construed as a crime, the defence cannot rely on nullum crimen sine lege
because the recruitment of child soldiers was not a lawful act. As set out
in Part I of this submission, there was a clear, irrefutable prohibition
established in conventional and customary international law prior to 30
November 1996.
Lastly, given that the recruitment of children violates the fundamental
duty to protect civilians in armed conflict; given its universal repugnance
and condemnation by the international community; and given the
criminality of violations of "Fundamental Guarantees" of Additional
115. Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, European Court of Human Rights,
judgment of 14 February 2001 (application numbers 34044/96, 35532/97, 44801/98) at
46.
116. Prosecutorv. Aleksovski (Judgment and Sentence, ICTY Appeals Chamber,
March 24, 2000) at 127.
117. Cassese at 152.

457

ProtocolH in jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR; amici submit that in
any case, invocation of the principle nullum crimen sine lege is
inappropriate because prosecution was reasonably foreseeable.
CONCLUSION

In Part I, amici have argued that the recruitment of children under
fifteen is and was unquestionably a violation of international humanitarian
law under conventional and customary law as of 30 November 1996.
Recruiting children into armed combat grievously offends the longstanding
and universal principle requiring belligerents to protect civilians in
armed conflict, and in particular, vulnerable groups including children
under fifteen. Indeed, the fundamental principle of the protection of
civilians in armed conflict is the entire raison d'etre of Geneva
Convention (IV). Specifically, the practice of recruiting children under
the age of fifteen is expressly prohibited in the "Fundamental Guarantees"
of Additional Protocol II and by the Convention on the Rights of the
Child In light of the number of states that are parties to the treaties,
evidencing widespread support from states with diverse political,
economic, social and political conditions, the provisions of both of these
treaties have entered the body customary law. More specifically, the
prohibition on child recruitment in international conventions, domestic
State practice, and the constant condemnation of the recruitment of
children by the Security Council and regional state organizations
demonstrate that the recruitment of children into armed conflict is a
violation of international humanitarian law.
Amici have argued in Part II that in some circumstances, international
law permits prosecutions of violations of international humanitarian law
irrespective of whether penal sanctions are attached. We conclude that
such prosecutions are permitted by law when the international
humanitarian law violations are of serious gravity, when they offend the
basic dignity of human beings, and when there is a sufficient international
consensus that perpetrators must bear individual responsibility. Amici
argue that the recruitment of children is considered to be an egregious
practice by the international community with grave consequences for
children, and as such is universally condemned. Most importantly, the
jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR upholds the criminal prosecution
for violations of the "Fundamental Guarantees" of Additional Protocol
II, which includes the prohibition on child recruitment. For these
reasons, amici conclude that the prohibition on the recruitment of
children had attained the character of a war crime under customary law.
Lastly, amici turn their attention to the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege. According to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
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Rights, the ICTY, and scholarly articles, nullum crimen sine lege cannot
be relied upon by a defendant who could not have reasonably believed
that his conduct was lawful at the time of commission. Indeed, a
defendant most certainly cannot invoke nullum crimen when an offence
is criminalized, or clearly prohibited in the case of international
humanitarian law. Amici therefore conclude that the doctrine cannot be
invoked either as a defence against the crime of recruiting children into
armed combat or as a challenge to the Court's jurisdiction to prosecute
for offences under Article 4(c) of its Statute.
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